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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I offer a reinterpretation of the economic geography of the so-called new 
Hollywood. The argument proceeds in six main stages. First, I briefly examine the debate on 
industrial organization in Hollywood that has gone on in the literature since the mid-1980s, and 
I conclude that the debate has become unnecessarily polarized. Second, I attempt to show how 
an approach that invokes both flexible specialization and systems-house forms of production is 
necessary to any reasonably complete analysis of the organization of production in the new 
Hollywood. Third, and on this basis, I argue that the Hollywood production system is deeply 
bifurcated into two segments comprising (a) the majors and their cohorts of allied firms on the 
one hand, and (b) the mass of independent production companies on the other. Fourth, I reaffirm 
the continuing tremendous agglomerative attraction of Hollywood as a locale for motion-picture 
production, but I also describe in analytical and empirical terms how selected kinds of activities 
seek out satellite production locations in other parts of the world. Fifth, I show how the majors 
continue to extend their global reach by means of their ever more aggressive marketing and 
distribution divisions, and I discuss how that this state of affairs depends on and amplifies the 
competitive advantages of Hollywood. Sixth and finally, I reflect upon some of the challenges 
that Hollywood must face up to as new cultural-products agglomerations arise all over the 
globe, offering potential challenges to its hegemony. 
 
Key words: motion-picture industry; cultural economy; Hollywood; agglomeration; regional 
development; globalization.   3
Introduction 
 
  Some time in the 1980s, entertainment industry analysts began to refer more and more 
insistently to a so-called “new Hollywood,” in contradistinction to the old Hollywood that had 
thrived over the pre-War decades on the basis of the classical studio system of production  (cf. 
Gomery, 1998; Litwak, 1986; Schatz, 1983; Smith, 1998). This new Hollywood emerged 
slowly and painfully out of the profound restructuring of the old studios that occurred from the 
1950s to the 1970s, and that finally resulted not only in a new business model but also in a new 
aesthetics of popular cinema. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century and on into the 
twenty-first, there has been a complex deepening and widening of the trends first recognized in 
terms of the new Hollywood, and the present paper is a modest effort to shed some light on the 
way these processes are currently working themselves out.  
  Hollywood has always been identified, in one of its principal representations, as a 
disembodied bundle of images. But it is, too, a distinctive geographic phenomenon, which, right 
from its historical beginnings a century ago, has assumed the form of a dense agglomeration of 
motion-picture production companies and ancillary services, together with a peculiar local labor 
market, within the wider context of Los Angeles (or, more generally, Southern California).
2  
This persisting geographic base has been the arena of many and perplexing transformations over 
the last few decades. In addition to the break-up of the old studio system, five principal changes 
have had particularly strong impacts. These are: 
1.  The penetration of new computerized technologies into all stages of the motion-picture 
production and distribution process.   4
2.  The steady bifurcation (as I shall argue) of the Hollywood production system into 
makers of high-concept blockbuster films and on the one side, and more modest 
independent filmmakers on the other. 
3.  The intensifying geographic decentralization of film-shooting activities away from the 
core complex of Hollywood. 
4.  The proliferation of new markets based on the packaging and repackaging of intellectual 
property rights.  
5.  The merging of the major studios (or “majors”) into giant media conglomerates whose 
scale of operation is nothing less than global. 
Not all of these changes are dealt with in equal depth in what follows, but they represent 
important background to any general examination of the recent growth and development of the 
Hollywood motion-picture industry. Three overarching themes structure the discussion of these 
changes here. The first is concerned with the changing logic and dynamics of Hollywood’s 
competitive advantages as a dense agglomeration of firms and workers and associated 
institutions. The second is focussed on the segmentation of production activities in Hollywood 
into two distinctive, though overlapping segments. The third deals with the ways in which 
Hollywood projects its outputs onto wider markets, and on the ways in which it is now greatly 
intensifying its global reach and hold.  
 
Economic Geography and the New Hollywood Debate 
The key research on the economic geography of the new Hollywood was carried out by 
Susan Christopherson and Michael Storper in the mid- to late-1980s (Christopherson and 
Storper, 1986; Storper,1989; and Storper and Christopherson, 1987). The basic argument set   5
forth by these two authors revolves around the transformation of the classical vertically-
integrated studio system of Hollywood into the much more vertically-disintegrated production 
complex that it has become today.  
Christopherson and Storper describe the old studio system in terms of a dominant group 
of seven majors, each of them vertically integrated across production, distribution, and 
exhibition. They also characterize the actual work of making films under the studio system as a 
mass production process (cf. Bordwell et al., 1985).  They then go on to claim that the 
restructuring of this system was induced by two main factors, i.e. the Paramount antitrust 
decision of 1948, and the advent of television in the 1950s. The Paramount decision forced the 
majors to divest themselves of their extensive theater (cinema) chains
3 (cf. Cassady, 1958), and 
television drained off the audiences that had previously flocked to motion-picture theaters. The 
net effect, according to Christopherson and Storper, was a dramatic rise in competitiveness, 
uncertainty, and instability in the motion-picture industry, followed by the break-up of studio-
based mass production, whose peculiar process and product configurations could no longer 
sustain profitable operations. Instead, the system was succeeded by a new order in which the 
majors divested themselves of much of their former productive capacity and contractual 
engagements, and became the nerve centers of vertically-disintegrated production networks.  In 
this process, many kinds of skilled employees who had previously been on studio payrolls 
(producers, directors, writers, actors, musicians, camera operators, and so on) became freelance 
agents of their own labor (Anderson, 1994). Equally, large numbers of small flexibly-
specialized firms sprang up in a wide range of subsectors in the motion-picture industry, 
providing both direct and indirect inputs of all kinds to the majors. This turn of events allowed 
the majors to cut their overheads, to pursue ever more diversified forms of production, and   6
eventually to flourish in the new high-risk Hollywood (cf. Kranton and Minehart, 2000).  
Recently, Caves (2000) has described this same kind of development in the creative industries 
generally as a contractual model of business activity. In Christopherson and Storper’s account, 
the break-up of the studio system and the emergence of a new flexibly-specialized Hollywood 
was associated with a “loss of control by the majors over production” (Storper, 1993, p. 482), 
though the authors also note that the majors continued to play important roles in Hollywood as 
centers of financing, deal-making, and distribution. With the reconstitution of the production 
system as a transactions-intensive congeries of small and specialized but complementary firms, 
the agglomerative forces holding the entire complex together in geographic space were 
reinforced and its regional competitive advantages secured. 
The Christopherson-Storper story represents the first really serious attempt to understand 
the organizational and locational foundations of Hollywood as a productive agglomeration, and 
it must be given high marks for its pioneering analysis, especially in view of the fact that the 
shifts the authors were trying to understand were far from having fully emerged and were still 
very much subject to confusing cross-currents. Their basic characterization of the new 
Hollywood in terms of shifting networks of small flexibly-specialized firms provides us with 
eminently useful insights, notwithstanding the criticism to which this idea has been subject of 
late. Analysts such as Aksoy and Robins (1992), Blair and Rennie (2000), Smith (1998), Véron 
(1999), and Wasko (1994), have all questioned the emphasis on flexible specialization, and have 
instead averred that contemporary patterns of production in Hollywood can only be understood 
as an expression of the economic power and leverage of the majors. Other recent work that has 
laid stress on the continuing muscle of the majors has been presented by Balio (1998), Gomery 
(1998), Litman (1998), Maltby (1998), and Schatz (1997), among others.    7
In actuality, it is no doubt fair to argue that Christopherson and Storper paid insufficient 
attention to the durability and importance of the role of the majors in the Hollywood production 
system, though they certainly did not overlook this aspect altogether. For their part, a number of 
the critics – notably, Aksoy and Robins -- can be faulted for their radical depreciation of the role 
played by small producers, amounting virtually to an exercise in writing them out of any 
meaningful analysis of contemporary Hollywood. Aksoy and Robins are right to maintain that 
oligopoly never ceased to exist in Hollywood, (though its foundations were greatly shaken over 
the 1960s and 1970s). However, they fail seriously to identify the sources of the majors’ market 
power, which at least since the Second World War has resided mainly in the internal economies 
of scale that characterize the their distribution systems (Huettig, 1944). The market power 
created in this manner is by no means necessarily incompatible with the existence of an efficient 
and dynamic production system based on flexible specialization à la Christopherson and 
Storper. In fact, in Aksoy and Robins’ account, we lose sight entirely of the production system 
itself as a dense regional complex made up of thousands of intricately interdependent firms, 
and, by the same token, of the independent segment of the industry as a substantial locus in its 
own right of innovation, skilled work, and many and varied final products.  
I shall attempt to demonstrate in what follows that a more accurate portrayal of 
Hollywood today involves acknowledgment of the important roles played by both large and 
small firms, i.e. by the majors, by independent production companies, and by the firms that 
supply them with different specialized service inputs. The argument interweaves with a further 
refrain focussing on the rapid globalization of Hollywood’s market range (Balio, 1996), and this 
phenomenon actually appears – for the moment at least – to be reinforcing the centripetal 
locational attraction of Southern California for motion-picture production activities of all kinds.    8
 
An Analytical Taxonomy of  Firms   
At the outset, we need to clarify some of the conceptual language that has already made 
its entry in the previous section, and to use this exercise as a platform for a more disciplined 
description of the motion-picture industry. This will help us, in addition, to overcome some of 
the more disabling elements of the one-sided debates about the extent of flexible specialization 
versus large-scale oligopolistic production and distribution in Hollywood today.  
In a very schematic way, any modern production system may be represented in terms of 
the size of its component units and the standardization (or variability) of their outputs. This idea 
is codified in Figure 1, where scale and standardization represent orthogonal axes defining a 
space within which any given unit of production can then be situated. Three paradigmatic 
outcomes relative to these axes are identified in the figure. One of these is designated mass 
production, which is exemplified by plants or establishments that produce standardized outputs 
in large quantities. Another is represented by systems houses,
4 which can be defined as large-
scale production units turning out limited numbers of extremely variable and complex products 
(like space satellites or blockbuster films). The third case is labeled flexible specialization, 
which refers to small production units that focus on a relatively narrow line of business (for 
example, talent agencies, costume designers or film editing services), but where the design 
specifications of each particular job, or batch of jobs, are different from all preceding jobs. A 
fourth paradigmatic case (corresponding to the northwest corner of Figure 1) can conceivably be 
identified in the guise of small-scale process industries (Adam Smith’s pin factory comes to 
mind), though this case would seem to be of limited empirical interest today. In reality, we 
rarely observe pure examples of these paradigmatic cases. Rather, actual production systems are   9
usually composed of more or less hybrid production units, representable by points at 
intermediate positions relative to the vertices in Figure 1. 
In spite of the notion developed by several analysts to the effect that the Hollywood 
studios had moved into something like paradigmatic mass production by the late 1930s, a brief 
scrutiny of their actual working operations reveals that this was not quite the case. Even less is it 
plausible to claim, as some have done (cf. Creton, 1994, 1997), that the system approximated to 
fordist mass production. Notwithstanding the efficiency gains that flowed from finely-grained 
technical divisions of labor, the use of continuity scripts, the constant re-utilization of formulaic 
plot structures, and the search for regular production schedules, film-making in the classical 
studio era was never standardized in any ultimate sense. We might argue, rather, that the 
classical studio can be represented by a location somewhere in the vicinity of point x in Figure 
1, which is to say that its technical and organizational configuration was marked by quite high 
levels of scale and a degree of routinization, but nothing equivalent, say, to the typical Detroit 
automobile assembly plant churning out identical models by the thousands.  
The old studios were nonetheless very much characterized by vertical integration over 
virtually all segments of the industry. Storper and Christopherson (1987) are probably correct to 
invoke the Paramount decision and the advent of television as being major factors in the 
destabilization of the industry’s markets and its consequent restructuring, though the fact that 
very similar processes of break-up were proceeding at the same time in the music-recording 
industry and in television broadcasting (cf. Hirsch, 2000; Scott, 1999a) suggests that there may 
well have been more general trends at work. In addition to the rupture between distribution and 
exhibition, two other main organizational effects flowed from vertical disintegration in the 
motion-picture industry. The first was the transformation of the studios themselves into   10
something closer to systems houses, i.e. large-scale (though comparatively downsized) 
establishments now focussing on the production of many fewer and increasingly grandiose 
films. The point labeled y in Figure 1 represents a typical case. The second was the emergence 
of masses of small independent production companies and service providers as exemplified by 
points z1 and z2 in Figure 1.  This second category of firms comprises flexibly-specialized 
producers and near relations in the sense that they concentrate on making a narrow range of 
outputs in comparatively limited quantities, and in ever-changing shapes and forms.  With the 
disintegration of the old studios after the 1940s, the latter types of firms colonized an enormous 
number of different market niches, and they have continued subsequently to push out the 
organizational boundaries of Hollywood, a notable recent instance being the formation of a 
vigorous special-effects sector in the 1980s and 1990s. To be sure, even in the age of the 
classical Hollywood studios, small specialized firms were not uncommon, but in no way did 
they achieve the significance, either as independent film producers or as specialized suppliers, 
that they have now.
5 
The Hollywood production system today can hence be described in terms of a prevailing 
pattern of major and independent film production companies (see Table 1), intertwined with 
ever-widening circles of direct and indirect input suppliers. These firms interact with one 
another in complicated ways as any given motion-picture production project moves through its 
three main stages of development, namely, (a) pre-production, involving elaboration of the 
initial idea, scenario preparation, raising finances, set design, casting, and so on; (b) production 
proper, an intense period in which large numbers of workers are mobilized in directing, acting, 
camera-operating, and numerous allied functions from set construction to lighting and make-up 
(DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998); and (c) post-production, namely, photographic processing, film   11
editing, sound editing, and so on.  In practice, as the discussion will now show, the production 
companies engaged in this sort of work can be segregated into two distinctive functional tiers, 
represented on the one side by the majors and associated firms (both subsidiaries and 
independents), and on the other side by a mass of independent production companies whose 
sphere of operations rarely or never intersects with that of the majors. 
 
A Bifurcated Production System 
The world of the majors. At the present time, there are eight major studios in 
Hollywood: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment 
(Columbia-Tristar), Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, Walt Disney Co., and Warner 
Brothers, together with newcomer Dreamworks, (see Figure 2). The first seven of these units 
are joined together in the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), which functions as 
an exclusive cartel promoting their interests. 
The majors have traditionally concentrated on the financing, production, and theatrical 
distribution of motion pictures, but over the last few decades they have actively diversified their 
operations, and they now earn as much if not more of their revenues through their specialized 
divisions in such fields as television programming, home video, multimedia, theme parks, and 
merchandising. Most of the Hollywood majors today constitute operating units within even 
larger multinational media and entertainment conglomerates (Litman, 2001). Three of these -- 
the News Corporation (which owns Fox), Sony (Columbia Tristar), and Vivendi (Universal) -- 
are foreign-owned. As Acheson and Maule (1994), Balio (1998), Gomery (1998), Prince 
(2000), Puttnam (1998), Wasko (1994) and others have suggested, the growing complexity of 
these conglomerates can be ascribed in large degree to attempts to internalize the synergies that   12
are frequently found at intersections between different segments of the media and entertainment 
(and hardware) industries. The modern media-entertainment conglomerate accordingly 
functions as a sort of parallel in economic space to industrial clusters in geographic space, i.e. as 
an economic collective, with the difference that if in the one case, the relevant synergies are 
activated under the umbrella of common ownership, in the other they owe their genesis to 
geographic proximity. Figure 2 sketches out the ownership relations between the Hollywood 
majors and their parent companies, as well as between the majors and their most important 
subsidiary film-production and distribution companies. However, the figure refers only to the 
feature-film operations of the majors and makes no reference to other divisions, e.g. in 
television programming or home video production.  
The majors as currently constituted engage in feature-film production with varying 
degrees of vertical integration and disintegration of the relevant tasks. One way in which they 
proceed entails integrated in-house development, shooting, and editing using their own creative 
staffs and equipment as basic resources. It is important to note in this context that whereas the 
majors today are certainly more vertically-disintegrated than their pre-War forerunners, they 
never fully gave up all of their capacity to produce motion pictures in-house, and in most 
instances, their continuing level of vertical integration is quite considerable. Many of them, for 
example, still own large-scale sound stages, and maintain significant pre- and post-production 
facilities, all of which are also available for lease by outside companies.
6  That said, as any 
given production project by the majors moves forward, other firms and individuals (such as 
producers, directors, set designers, and so on) are commonly brought in on a subcontract or 
limited-term contract basis to perform specific tasks.   13
Another way in which the majors proceed is to work with smaller production companies, 
where the latter assume primary responsibility for organizing overall production tasks. The 
smaller companies involved in these ventures comprise both the major’ own subsidiaries and 
selected independent producers, in projects that may range anywhere from a niche-oriented film 
to a high-budget blockbuster. In these collaborative ventures, the majors work in a range of 
protocols, though in probably the majority of cases these grant significant control to the majors 
over production and editing decisions. Typical procedures include financing, production, and 
distribution deals, co-production pacts, joint ventures, split rights agreements, “first look” 
contracts, and any and all combinations of these arrangements. The majors also enter into 
negative pick-up contracts with independents, that is, agreements to distribute films that have 
already been completed before being brought to the attention of any given studio. Many 
independents also unilaterally assemble packages of scripts, actors, directors, and other assets 
that they then present to the studios in the hope of securing a production or distribution 
agreement, though few are ever successful (Acheson and Maule, 1994).  
The data given in Table 2 shed important light on the evolving world of the majors.  The 
table indicates the number of releases by majors and their subsidiary companies at five-year 
intervals since 1980. Recall that the release or distribution of films is to be distinguished from 
the actual production of films, and that the majors release films made by themselves or their 
subsidiaries as well as films in which independent production companies participate in different 
degrees. By contrast, releases by subsidiaries owned by the majors are overwhelmingly 
produced by smaller independent companies. Many of these subsidiaries (e.g. Castle Rock, 
Miramax, New Line, Orion Pictures) began their existence as independents; others (like Fox    14
Searchlight or Universal Focus were set up as auxiliary units from the start. Table 2 reveals that 
since 1980, the number of films released by the majors proper has remained more or less 
constant at close to a hundred a year, whereas the subsidiaries have greatly increased 
production, in parallel with production in the independent sector (see below). Thus, although the 
majors continue to dominate the entire industry, and continue to maintain a significant degree of 
in-house production capacity, they also rely more and more on smaller subsidiaries and 
independent production companies in order to spread their risks, to diversify their market 
offerings, and to sound out emerging market opportunities. In this connection, the business 
strategies of the motion-picture industry majors strongly resemble those of majors in the music 
business (Dale, 1997; Hirsch, 2000; Scott, 1999a; Negus, 1998).  
The world of the independents. The independent segment of the industry represents an 
important and flourishing element of the Hollywood complex. As the information set forth in 
Table 1 suggests, independent film production has increased greatly over the last two decades, 
with the period of most intense growth being the early to mid-1980s when a boom in 
independent film production occurred, fuelled by the growth of ancillary markets (Prince, 
2000). Independent production companies make films for both domestic and foreign markets, 
for presentation in any and all formats (theatrical exhibition, television, or home video). They 
cater to a great variety of market niches, and their outputs include art films for specialized 
audiences, genre movies of all kinds, documentaries, television commercials, and direct-to-
video films (among which a fair proportion is composed of the numerous pornographic films 
made by firms clustered in the San Fernando Valley). The distribution of films made by 
independent producers is handled for the most part by independent distribution companies,   15
many of them highly specialized with respect to market niche (Donahue, 1987; Rosen and 
Hamilton, 1987).  
According to County Business Patterns some three-and-a-half thousand establishments 
were engaged in motion-picture and video production (NAICS 51211) in the five counties of 
Southern California in 1999, and the median size of these establishments was just two 
employees. The vast majority of these establishments comprise a cohort of independent 
production companies, some of which are allied with majors but most of which operate in an 
entirely separate sphere. Thus, in face-to-face interviews with representatives of many different 
firms it was found that significant numbers – perhaps the majority -- of Hollywood 
independents rarely or never come into contact with a major, and work in an entirely separate 
sphere of commercial and creative activity. This observation is confirmed by results from a 
postal survey of independent production companies in Hollywood carried out in the summer of 
2001. Out of a total of 115 respondents who were asked if they had engaged in any production 
deals with majors over the previous twelve months, 83 (72.2%) responded in the negative, and it 
was evident that some of those who responded positively were actually making a very liberal 
interpretation of the term “major.” Additionally, the average response to a question asking firms 
to rate the dependence of their business upon the production and distribution divisions of majors 
on a scale ranging from one (no dependence) to five (high dependence) was a rather low 2.8.  
 A bipartite or tripartite system? It is to be stressed that the two tiers of productive 
activity identified above are far from being hermetically sealed off from one another. First of 
all, there are obvious symbioses between the two in the sense that each generates externalities 
that are of value to the other, including important flows of new talent from the lower to the 
upper tier. Second of all, some independent production companies work partially in the one tier   16
and partially in the other, and others move erratically in and out of the sphere of operation of the 
majors. Indeed, we might well want to qualify any description of the Hollywood production 
complex as a bifurcated system with the idea that the two tiers described above are actually 
complemented by a more indistinct circle of companies as represented by independents strongly 
allied to the majors together with the majors’ own subsidiaries. This middle tier provides a 
shifting but evidently widening bridge between the two more clearly definable segments as 
represented by the majors proper and the pure independents. 
 
The Geography and Dynamics of the Hollywood Production Complex. 
A schematic overview. Hollywood is neither just a metaphor nor just a business model; 
it is also a unique place, with a very distinctive structure as a production locale. As such, one 
important approach to understanding its character and evolution is offered by the contemporary 
theory of industrial districts and regional development. Since there already exists a large general 
body of literature on this issue (see, for example, Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Porter, 2001; Scott 
1993; Storper and Scott, 1995), I shall be brief in what follows.  
The key elements of the Hollywood production complex today can be described by 
reference to four main functional and organizational features (see Figure 3). These are: 
1.  A series of overlapping production networks in various states of vertical disintegration. The 
nodes of these networks are composed of majors, independents, and providers of specialized 
services from script writing to film editing.  
2.  A local labor market comprising a large number of individuals differentiated according to 
skills, sensibilities, and forms of habituation. This labor market is constantly being 
replenished by new talent from all over the rest of North America and the world.   17
3.  An institutional environment made up of many organizations and associations representing 
firms, workers, and governmental agencies.
7 Some of these organizations exert considerable 
influence over the developmental trajectory of the industry. 
4.  A regional milieu whose peculiar geographic and historical features emerge in part in 
relation to the phenomena identified in points 1, 2, and 3, and which is a repository of 
crucial resources for the industry. These range from the cinematic traditions that are 
embedded, as it were, in the very fabric of Hollywood as a production locale, through the 
conventionalized background landscapes of Southern California, to the synergy-laden 
potentials offered by proximity to the region’s many other cultural-products industries 
(Molotch, 1996). 
These four points all allude to important positive externalities underlying the Hollywood 
production complex, endowing it with strong competitive advantages in the form of increasing 
returns to scale and scope and positive agglomeration economies. Such advantages are 
fundamental in maintaining the status of the region as the leading center of motion-picture 
production in the world today. They are also major elements of an organizational-geographic 
framework that functions as a seed-bed of creativity and innovation for the industry (cf. Scott, 
1999b).  Like many other regional complexes, this framework evinces a periodic tendency to 
lock-in to relatively fixed configurations over time; yet so far in its long history, the industry 
has always in the end managed to overcome the many crises of adjustment that have been 
sparked off by periodic shifts in basic technological and market conditions like the invention of 
talking movies or the development of new digital technologies. 
Two other brief remarks complement the discussion of Figure 3, and will be picked up again 
in more detail later. First, in spite of the centripetal locational pull of Hollywood, expanding   18
streams of production activities have been moving to distant satellite locations since the 1980s. 
Second, distribution represents an especially critical adjunct to production. Without effective 
distribution, the production system could attain neither the scale nor the scope that help to make 
it such a formidable source of competitive advantages today. 
  Development and growth, 1980 – 2000. All of this productive activity calls for an 
enormous variety of worker skills, service inputs and entrepreneurial effort, and Southern 
California offers an extraordinarily dense concentration of these assets. Most of the industry is 
clustered in a relatively small geographic area centered on Hollywood itself, but also spilling 
over into other parts of the region. The detailed geographic outlines of the complex are 
represented by Figure 4, which shows the locations of individual production companies in the 
region. Observe the dense swath of firms sweeping from Burbank in the east through the central 
pivot of Hollywood to Beverly Hills and Santa Monica in the west. Remarkably few production 
companies are located outside this dense primary cluster.  
  The motion-picture industry has grown greatly in Los Angeles County over the last few 
decades, as indicated by Figures 5 and 6, which trace out changes in employment and number of 
establishments in motion-picture production and in allied services since 1980.  The information 
presented in these two figures is defined in terms of the old standard industrial classification 
(SIC), as opposed to the new North American industrial classification system (NAICS) that 
succeeded it in 1997. As it happens, SIC 7812 (Motion Picture and Video Production) is 
perfectly matched by NAICS 51211 and thus we can extend any data series under the former 
rubric beyond 1997. SIC 7819 (Services Allied to Motion Pictures) has no corresponding 
NAICS codes, so that data series defined under this rubric cannot be continued after 1997. Over 
the period 1980 to 1999, employment in SIC 7812 in Los Angeles County actually declined   19
from 39,318 to 29,262; by contrast, the number of establishments in the same sector increased 
massively from 983 to 3,237.  Employment in SIC 7819 grew from 10,946 to 120,000 from 
1980 to 1997, and the number of establishments in the same sector expanded from 509 to 2,326, 
which clearly reflects the great rise in demand for intermediate inputs to the industry, including 
special effects and other digital services (Hozic, 1999, 2001; Scott, 1998). Thus, taken as a 
whole, motion-picture production and service activities (SIC 7812 plus SIC 7819) in Los 
Angeles County grew at a rate of 194.0% for employment and 248% for establishments 
between 1980 and 1997. This trend runs parallel to the considerable increase in the total number 
of films produced in the United States over the same period (from 214 in 1980 to 684 in 2000, 
according to MPAA records). The global deregulation of television in the 1980s and 1990s no 
doubt also helped to stimulate this expansion. In the same period, a significant downsizing of 
establishments occurred in SIC 7812, in association with a corresponding increase in average 
establishment size in SIC 7819. In the former case, establishment size in Los Angeles County 
fell from 39.9 to 9.0 employees on average; in the latter, it rose from 21.5 to 51.6. It is tempting 
to interpret these data in terms of continued vertical disintegration in production and increasing 
internal economies of scale in associated service providers, but in the absence of suitable 
statistics at the individual firm level, analysis of the precise mechanisms at work here must 
await further research. 
  Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the growth of the motion-picture industry in Southern 
California has been accompanied by parallel expansion of the industry (and most notably by an 
increase in the number of small establishments) in the rest of the United States. Even so, 
Southern California remains the primary agglomeration in the country, followed in distant 
second place by New York.  In 1980, combined employment in SICs 7812 and 7819 in Los   20
Angeles County represented 63.3% of the US total. In 1997, the figure was 61.4%. Hence, the 
industry not only continued to grow in absolute terms in Los Angeles over the 1980s and 1990s, 
but maintained its high level of relative geographic concentration as well. 
Satellite production locations. Despite this outstanding historical performance, there has 
been much decentralization of production activities from Hollywood to satellite locations in 
recent years. Decentralization occurs for two main reasons, one being the search for realistic 
outdoor film locations (which has always been a feature of the industry’s operations), the other 
being the search for reduced production costs (which is a more recent phenomenon). In the 
vernacular of contemporary Hollywood, firms engaging in these two types of decentralization 
are referred to as  “creative runaways” and “economic runaways” respectively (Monitor, 1999). 
 A number of studies have shown that the latter kind of decentralization has been 
increasing rapidly for film-shooting activities since the late 1980s (Coe, 2001; EIDC, 2001; 
ITA, 2001; Monitor, 1999). Most of it is directed to Canada, Australia, Britain, and Mexico, 
with Canada receiving 81% of the total. The Monitor Company (1999) estimates that the total 
dollar loss to the United States as a result of economic runaways was $2.28 billion in 1998. The 
presumed Canadian share of this total is $1.85 billion. By contrast, the Canadian Film and 
Television Production Association estimates that total revenues from foreign film shooting in 
Canada in the 1999/2000 season was just $1.00 billion
8 (CFTPA, 2001).  Even given the 
discrepancy between these two estimates, the total loss to Hollywood is evidently of major 
proportions, and the point is underlined by the fact that of 1,075 US film and television projects 
surveyed in 1998, 285 involved runaway production to foreign countries (Monitor, 1999).  
According to EIDC (2001), most of this activity is currently accounted for by television 
productions, with movie-of-the-week programs being the staple item.    21
  Figure 7 provides a simple analytical language for thinking about this issue. The central 
elements of the figure are average cost curves for a particular package of production tasks (in 
the present instance, film shooting) at two different locations. One of these, Hollywood, is the 
home base, the other is a satellite location. The cost curves depict typical increasing and 
decreasing returns effects as a function of the size of any given package, with c1 representing 
production in Hollywood, and c2 production in the satellite location. We may assume that there 
are fixed set-up costs at the satellite location so that c2 is greater than c1 at relatively low levels 
of production; but because of various advantages at the satellite location, c2 falls below c1 at 
higher levels. Among these advantages we may count relatively low wages, low rental rates for 
sound stages and equipment, advantageous foreign exchange rates, governmental tax credits and 
subsidies, and so on (ITA, 2001). Any shift of production from the home base to a satellite 
location also entails transactions costs, including expenses for transport of personnel and 
equipment, communications charges between the home base and the satellite as production is 
proceeding, and perhaps most importantly of all, implicit costs due to diminished managerial 
and creative control over day-to-day work activities and hence over the quality of the final 
product. These transactions costs (which may, like production costs, be subject to increasing 
and decreasing returns) are apt to be particularly onerous where a high-budget feature film is 
concerned, but relatively low in the case of a more routine television program with limited 
production values and frequent repetition of the basic package specifications. The interplay 
between average production costs and transactions costs at different levels of scale then 
determines whether runaway production is economically feasible in any given case. As shown 
in Figure 7, a strong production cost advantage at the satellite location can be completely 
eliminated where transactions costs are high; then, as transactions costs are lowered there will   22
be a greater and greater incentive to shift production to the satellite location. Eventually, if 
average transactions costs fall from t1 to t2, as in Figure 7, production at the satellite is likely to 
occur for task packages larger than p.   
This exercise clarifies the interactions between all of the various costs brought into play 
in runaway production relative to the size and complexity of the tasks to be completed. In view 
of this analysis, we can obtain a clearer grasp of just why (relatively standardized) television 
films are more susceptible to runaway production than feature films. And we can extend the 
analysis by increasing the number of possible satellite locations.  For example, a significant 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar from its current exchange rate of C$1.54 per US$1.00 to 
C$1.15 per US$1.00, will just offset the reputed 25% cost advantage of Canada for film 
production, therefore making substitute satellite locations more attractive. In view of this logic, 
there is every likelihood that Hollywood will continue indefinitely to lose certain kinds of 
production to one country or another, subject to the availability of adequate sound stage 
facilities and crews at alternative locations. A dramatic parallel case can be found in the Los 
Angeles clothing industry where a steady increase in offshore “full-package” contracting has 
been occurring since the late 1980s (Kessler, 1999; Scott, 2002). So far, runaway production has 
not seriously undermined the vitality of the Hollywood film industry, and it may well never 
become life threatening, at least in the more creative segments of the industry. This inference is 
based on a presumption (a) that the towering competitive advantages of Hollywood in pre- and 
post-production work will continue to prevail, and (b) that films requiring close supervisory 
control and complex customized inputs at all stages of production will continue to constitute a 
significant core of the industry’s product range. Accordingly, and even though the great flow of 
shooting activities to Canada has unquestionably given a developmental boost to the motion-  23
picture industries of Toronto and Vancouver where most of the work takes place (cf. Coe, 
2000a, 2000b, 2001), there seems little reason to suppose that the locational attractions of 
Hollywood are on the point of dissipation. In the same way, it is surely implausible to claim, 
along with Clough (2000), that as a consequence of the increasing use of special effects and 
digital technologies in the industry, its center of gravity in California may be shifting toward the 
Bay Area. The claim is yet more implausible (despite the defection of Industrial Light and 
Magic to Marin County in the late 1970s) in view of the extensive development of precisely a 
robust cluster of digital media and special effects firms in Southern California over the last 
decade (Scott, 1998). 
  In brief, Hollywood’s competitive advantages  -- deriving from its overlapping 
transactional networks, the skills and creativity of its workers, its dense institutional 
underpinnings (including the many guilds, labor unions, and producers’ associations), its roots 
in a supportive regional milieu (one of whose attributes is the diverse and striking visual 
imagery of Southern California), and its proximity to related cultural-products industries – 
would appear to afford it some durability as a going concern. Its current vibrancy is all the more 
assured when we add to these advantages, the benefits that it derives from its unparalleled 
distribution system, (Wildman and Siwek, 1988).  Accordingly, the pronouncements of Aksoy 
and Robins (1992, p. 19) to the effect that “Hollywood is now everywhere … production now 
moves almost at will to find its most ideal conditions, and with it go skills, technicians, and 
support services,” and of Hozic (2001, p. 153) who talks about “Hollywood’s exodus into 
worldwide locations,” are both exaggerated and premature.  
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Distribution, Markets, and Competition 
Hollywood today is a large-scale, many-sided, cultural-production and franchising 
complex, disgorging an endless variety of products designed for many different market niches. 
The linchpin of the entire system is the high-concept, mass-appeal blockbuster, that is, a big-
budget film with a simple but climactic central narrative, an uplifting finale, a major star 
presence, and possessing many marketable assets (Branston, 2000; Garvin, 1981; Wasko, 1994; 
Wyatt, 1994). The origins of this type of film are usually traced back to Jaws in the mid-1970s, 
with Titanic as its ultimate expression to date.
9  The market for all films is risky, and the high-
concept blockbuster faces especially hazardous prospects. Only a few such films actually recoup 
their costs directly from theatrical exhibition, but the ones that do generally compensate for the 
ones that do not (de Vany and Walls, 1997). In addition, the studios now also reap large 
revenues from repackaging films for home video, broadcast and cable television licensing, 
product placements and spin-off products such as recorded music, games, toys, fashions, books, 
theme park rides, and so on. 
The distribution system. Distribution has always been a vital element of the motion-picture 
industry. The distribution system disseminates the industry’s products on wider markets, pumps 
revenues and information back into Hollywood, and hence is a basic condition of the sustained 
economic well-being of the central agglomeration (see Figure 3). 
Employment in the distribution branch of the business is densely developed in Los 
Angeles alongside the production activities that it serves. In 1999, Los Angeles County could 
claim 22,399 employees and 299 establishments in NAICS 51212 (Motion-Picture and Video 
Distribution), compared with 27,669 employees and 706 establishments in the entire United 
States. Distribution is the segment of the industry where oligopoly is most in evidence. For the   25
United States as a whole in 1997, the four-firm concentration ratios in NAICS 51212 was 
74.6%, as compared with equivalent ratios of 33.5% and 16.4% in NAICS 51211 (Motion 
Picture and Video Production) and NAICS 51219 (Post-Production and Other Motion Picture 
and Video Industries), respectively.10  This high level of concentration derives from the internal 
economies of scale that are inherent to distribution activities, especially where, as in the film 
industry, they assume the form of extensive networks with strong central management and 
widely-diffused regional offices. These networks can then be organized on the basis of 
repetitive operating rules in which the transmission of the variable product itself becomes 
relatively routinized. The economics of blockbuster production, with its associated logic of 
high-intensity, saturation marketing and distribution, greatly intensifies this tendency to 
concentration, especially given that the marketing and distribution costs of many blockbusters 
today are equal to or even greater than their actual production costs (Cones, 1997). 
For any given blockbuster, prevailing marketing/distribution practices typically entail 
intense publicity campaigns over a short period of time, and exhibition in many different 
theaters simultaneously.
11  These practices, combined with the huge sums of money at stake, 
make it imperative for the majors to engage in close relational contracting with owners of 
theater chains to secure assured and regular bookings well in advance of the publicized release 
date of their films. By the same token, there are certainly strong incentives to vertical 
reintegration of the entire production-distribution-exhibition chain in the motion-picture 
industry (cf. Blackstone and Bowman, 1999; Waterman, 1982), and vertical integration has 
indeed been on the increase of late.  This development can be traced back to the Reagan era 
when the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department began to take a more tolerant attitude 
toward infringements of the Paramount decision (Prince, 2000), and by the early 1990s,   26
according to Prindle (1993), the majors owned over ten percent of all theaters in the United 
States.  
In light of these remarks, it is not surprising to observe that the same bifurcation 
characteristic of production activities in the Hollywood motion-picture industry is also -- and 
even more – characteristic of distribution. As Table 3 indicates, nine of the top ten film 
distributors in the United States are either majors or subsidiaries of majors, and the one 
independent shown in the table (USA Films) has only recently displaced MGM from the top 
ten. The point is brought further home by an examination of detailed box-office statistics for 
films distributed in the United States. Consider Figure 8, which shows frequency counts of 
domestic box-office returns for major and independent producers. The figure is based on 142 
films released by majors, and 304 films released by independents in 1999. A strikingly bimodal 
structure characterizes the pattern of frequencies displayed in Figure 8, and the two counts 
overlap only in a small intermediate zone. For independent distributors, the average domestic 
box-office per film is $2.3 million, and for majors it is $46.1 million. So great is the discrepancy 
between the two, there might well be a prima facie case for inferring that the majors are in some 
sense crowding the independents out of more lucrative markets (Daly, 1980).  The business 
concentration of the majors is magnified by what Cones (1997) refers to as their “creative 
accounting” practices, where revenues are creamed off at the distribution phase, thus reducing 
the flow-back to production and by the same token diminishing claims for payment by outside 
contractors based on a percentage of producers’ revenues. 
In a study of motion-picture distribution in Canada, Globerman and Vining (1987) have 
claimed that because there is rotating leadership among the larger distributors, and low barriers 
to entry at the bottom end of the system, the market is “workably competitive.”  Whatever the   27
situation in Canada may be, the very marked concentration in the distribution sector in the 
United States, and the difficulties of outsider penetration into the top tier of the sector mean that 
significant impediments to competition exist. This situation can scarcely be qualified as being 
anything but oligopolistic. 
  The globalization of Hollywood. Astute marketing and distribution are crucial not only 
to the majors’ domination of domestic markets, but to their ever-growing incursions on foreign 
markets too (Hoskins et al., 1997; Jarvie, 1998; Scott, 2000).  
  Table 4 shows the main pattern of US film and tape rentals to other countries over the 
period from 1986 to 1999. The first thing to notice from the data displayed is the tremendous 
growth in the total volume of exports since 1986 (364.7% growth in terms of constant dollars 
compared with 28.9% growth in domestic box office returns). Europe is the main destination 
with 65.5% of all exports in 1999, followed by Asia and the Pacific region with 17.4%. Britain, 
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Japan are the top individual importers. Two of the 
majors provided unpublished information to the author indicating that they own distribution 
facilities in all of the main countries mentioned in Table 4, as well as in a number of lesser 
markets such as Austria, Finland, Israel, Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama, and Peru. In yet other 
markets the majors engage in joint ventures and contractual agreements with local distributors. 
It is not uncommon for the majors to have a main office in the largest city in their principal 
foreign markets (almost always in geographical association with an agglomeration of local 
audiovisual firms), together with a number of field offices in the provinces (cf. Bonnell, 1996; 
Nachum and Keeble, 2000). Since 1995 the costs of Hollywood feature films released by the 
majors have on average consistently exceeded their domestic box office returns, so that foreign 
box-office earnings are now critical to overall profitability (cf. Vogel, 1998). Thus, contrary to   28
views expressed from time to time by European critics about the “dumping” of Hollywood films 
on foreign markets, this is not strictly the case in economic terms, even if the charge may ring a 
sympathetic chord on a more cultural register. 
Strategic trade rather than dumping is Hollywood’s trump card in international 
commerce. In contradistinction to classical atomized competition between individual free-
wheeling firms, strategic trade is an outcome of imperfect competition in the context of 
increasing-returns effects, and is hence a source of rents over and above normal profits. In the 
case of the motion-picture industry, these effects derive in important ways from the potent 
agglomeration economies of Hollywood itself and from efficiencies of size in distribution, and 
it is almost certainly these endowments that constitute the primary source of the strategic 
prowess that has pushed American films so firmly to the fore in so many different foreign 
markets. Concomitantly, the relatively less well-developed character of these endowments in 
the film industries of other countries severely impedes them from making stronger inroads into 
American markets (Chase, 2000; Waterman and Jayakar, 2000). There are no doubt also 
marketing difficulties that foreign films in the United States face as a result of peculiarities of 
language and culture, though it is difficult to understand why these should operate necessarily in 
one direction but not in the other, all else being equal. In fact, all else is far from being equal, 
because over the entire post-War period, large US-based multinational corporations have honed 
their competencies to a fine point in matters of commercial propaganda and far-flung product 
distribution, perhaps most especially in media, entertainment, and other culturally-charged 
products. Even if the multinationals of other countries are rapidly catching up in this respect, the 
pioneering efforts of US firms have more or less naturalized American cinematic idioms on 
many foreign markets, making Hollywood films highly competitive with purely local products   29
(Finney, 1996; Waterman and Jayakar, 2000). Furthermore, under the provisions of the Webb-
Pomerane Act of 1918, monopolistic practices on the part of American firms are explicitly 
permitted on foreign markets, enabling them to penetrate and dominate those markets more 
effectively. Thus, block-booking by US-owned film distributors is prevalent in foreign markets, 
even though it is illegal in the United States. 
The rents generated by strategic trade can almost always be much enhanced by agencies 
of collective action, such as industry associations and governmental bodies. A standard 
maneuver in this regard is to work on clearing away obstacles that limit access to foreign 
markets, thus releasing new rounds of growth based on self-perpetuating increasing-returns 
effects. This is certainly a principal objective of the powerful MPAA, which has offices in 
Washington, DC., and Los Angeles, as well as in several foreign countries. The MPAA is a 
highly-financed cartel representing the combined voice of the majors, and it has proven itself to 
be extraordinarily aggressive and successful in shaping trade agendas in audiovisual products, 
as well as in many other political tasks of concern to the industry. Thanks to the lobbying efforts 
of the MPAA, Hollywood has always received untold help from the US Commerce Department 
and the US State Department (Segrave, 1997). Under the banner of free trade and fair 
competition, it has long carried out intensive lobbying campaigns with different government 
agencies in the effort to pressure foreign countries to lower barriers to the strategic trading 
activities of its members. Independent distributors, too, have a collective representative in the 
guise of the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), which is based in Los Angeles and 
counts over 170 different companies as members. Besides vigorous defense of its members’ 
interests in general, AFMA also holds the annual American Film Market in Santa Monica,   30
which has grown over the last two decades to become the world’s largest motion-picture fair, 
attended by more than 7,000 people from 70 countries. 
  The very success of American motion pictures on foreign markets has, of course, given 
rise to a world-wide debate not just about the economics of trade in audiovisual products, but 
also about the cultural predicaments that follow in its train (Chase, 2000; Feigenbaum, 1999). 
The issue came to a head in the GATT negotiations of 1993, when, under the prompting of the 
European Union backed up strongly by France, audiovisual products were exempted from the 
trade liberalization provisions contained in the final agreement. It is, however, an open question 
as to how long the exemption will survive in its present form under the newly-constituted WTO.  
In any case, stubborn cultural and political resistances to the globalization of Hollywood are 
evident all over the world, from Canada to China and from France to South Korea. And since 
culture is always, and in profound ways, about identity, ideology, and power, as much as it is 
about profits and cash flow, the current situation poses predicaments that call for some more 
imaginative framework of supra-national regulation than approaches based on the erroneous 
proposition that cultural products are essentially just inert commodities like steel or car parts. 
 
Conclusion 
With the steady improvement of electronic methods of distribution and information 
diffusion, the predicaments alluded to in the previous paragraph are liable to intensify greatly. 
This remark reflects in part the speed with which new communications technologies are 
currently demolishing international borders; it also is based on an expectation that the majors 
are just as likely to dominate content supply in the new order as they have done in the old. More 
accurately, we should say that if, in theory, new electronic means of communications allow   31
small producers to tap readily into global markets, the massive resources of the majors will still 
in all likelihood enable them to gain a decisive edge in publicity and marketing, and hence in 
sales.  
Over a more distant time horizon, the situation becomes increasingly murky.  For one 
thing, as I have argued elsewhere (Scott, 2001), new and revivified cultural-products 
agglomerations are on the rise in many different parts of the world today. Notwithstanding the 
current hegemony of Hollywood, the ingredients of its success are not in principle forever 
locked in at one place, and it is entirely conceivable that other regions may eventually mount 
credible challenges to it on global markets, even granted the enormous hurdles that exist. For 
another thing, policy-makers in other countries are now turning their attention to the tasks of 
building indigenous cultural-products industries with much greater capacities for market 
contestation than in the past. In the European Union, for example, the Media Plus Program 
initiated in January 2001 (in succession to the earlier Media I and Media II programs) is now 
engaged in a many-sided effort to improve the international competitiveness of the European 
audiovisual industries, including a push to put more effective distribution systems into place. 
The increasing trend to international co-productions lends further complexity to these matters. 
Moreover, expansionist European media corporations such as Vivendi, Bertelsmann, or 
Polygram are vigorously scouring the world for new production and marketing opportunities 
while at the same time strengthening their roots in their home territories. Quite apart from these 
developments, the notorious unpredictability of consumer tastes in matters of popular culture 
means that Hollywood production companies can never rest on their laurels. They are always 
potentially subject to devastating competition from unexpected quarters, and despite 
Hollywood’s long domination of world-wide film markets, its ascendance can never be absolute   32
or final. Indeed, there have been numerous instances in the past when it has faltered even on its 
home terrain, including the notable period in the late 1960s when imports grew to the point 
where they represented fully two-thirds of all the films released in the United States (Schatz, 
1997). 
  If these comments point to potential perils ahead, Hollywood in its current incarnation is 
nonetheless one of the most remarkable examples of a successful industrial agglomeration 
anywhere in the world. Its size and complexity, its longevity, its global impact, and the 
mystique that surrounds its products, all combine to bring it into sharp relief. It is all the more 
fascinating because unlike many other case-study industrial districts, (Silicon Valley, Orange 
County, or Boston’s Route 128, for example), its outputs trade on a purely cognitive register. 
For this reason alone, Hollywood is one of the most arresting examples of the burgeoning 
cultural-products agglomerations that are on the rise all over the world today, no matter whether 
their stock-in-trade is film, multimedia, music, fashion, or any other vehicle of aesthetic and 
semiotic expression. 
In the present paper, I have described the mainsprings of the Hollywood production 
complex, with special reference to its status as both a local and a global system of relationships. 
I have attempted, in particular, to lay out a new map of Hollywood and the world that is 
attentive to the ways in which this local/global system reflects the industry’s peculiar tendency 
to structural and functional bifurcation. Much more research, of course, is needed on particular 
aspects of Hollywood’s operations, including many questions about new digital technologies, 
creativity and innovation, local labor markets, the institutional fabric of the industry, 
agglomeration and decentralization processes, corporate organization, marketing, the dynamics 
of demand, and so on. The discussion presented here offers a conceptual and empirical context   33
that eases the task of approaching these and allied questions. The discussion also points firmly, 
if laconically, to the steady convergence that appears to be occurring between the economic and 
the cultural in contemporary global capitalism, and to a few of the important analytical 
problems raised by this turn of events.  
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Table 1. Feature films released in the United States by majors and independents.
a 
 
Year                        Releases 
--------------------------------------------- 
  Majors        Independents       Total 






134                    57                   191 
     138                   251                   389 
     158                   227                   385 
     212                   158                   370 
     191                   270                   461 
aNote that in this table, the term majors refers to both the majors proper and their subsidiary 
releasing companies.  
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Table 2. Films released by majors and their subsidiaries, 1980 – 2000.  
 
Year  Releases           Releases by      Subsidiaries as a 
by majors         majors’             percent of majors 







94                     0                       0 
103                   12                     11.7 
109                   27                     24.8 
   127                     85                     66.9 
   104                     75                     72.1 
 
Source: Calculated from information in: Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Annual 
Index to Motion Picture Credits. Subsidiaries involved in these counts are: Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Dimension Films, Fine Line Features, Fox Searchlight, Miramax, New Line 
Distribution, October Films, Orion Pictures, Orion Film Classics, Paramount Classics, Sony 
Classics, Tristar Pictures, Triumph Releasing, Twentieth Century Fox International Classics, 
United Artists Films, Universal Focus and Warner Classics. Note that some of these entities 
have operated as independents at various times, and some are no longer in existence. They are 
included in the present counts only for years when they actually functioned as subsidiaries of 
majors. Buena Vista Pictures is the principal distributing arm of Disney and is treated as a 
major. The discrepancies observable between the data given in Table 1 and Table 2 stem from 
the different sources used.  
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New Line (Warner) 
USA Films 
  19 
  15 
  22 
  14 
  12 
  10 
  22 
  25 
  14 
  17 
 1,089 
 1,053 
    863 
    849 
    792 
    668 
    664 
    507 
    388 
    202 
  57.3 
  70.2 
  39.2 
  60.6 
  66.0 
  66.8 
  30.2 
  20.3 
  27.7 
  11.9 
             Totals:  170   7,075    41.7 
 
Source: Hollywood Reporter, Film 500, August, 2001.  
   44
Table 4.  US exports in the form of film and tape rentals; percentage values by destination. 














       
        Europe 
 
10.2         8.6         8.6         7.8 
  7.5         9.6       10.5       13.2 
10.0         7.3         4.7         5.3 
15.2       17.5       17.4       11.5 
   -            5.1        5.9         6.6 
   -            1.8        1.4         1.2 
10.6        11.0        9.8       13.4 
 





Republic of Korea 
Taiwan 
 
       Asia and Pacific 
 
10.3          3.4        4.8        4.6 
  8.3        11.5        8.7        7.7 
   -            0.8        1.8        1.1 
   -            0.5        0.7        1.1 
 







    Americas 
 
    -             0.8        2.2       2.9 
10.4           8.7        6.8       5.2 
  1.3           0.9        1.3       1.8 
 





       Africa 
 
  -              -          1.1       1.0 
 
  -            1.0        1.2        1.1 
 
 
       Middle East 
 
  -            0.5        0.8        1.2 
 
 
World ($ millions, current) 
World ($ millions, constant) 
 
1,071   1,962    4,982     7,556 
1,628   2,400    5,290     7,566 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business.   45
       
Figure 1. Schema of basic organizational possibilities in industrial systems: x and y represent 
old- and new-style studios, respectively; z1 and z2 represent common kinds of independent 
production companies or service suppliers.   46
 
Figure 2. The Hollywood majors: corporate ownership relations. Sources: various directories, 
reports, and web sites.   47





Figure 3. Schema of the Hollywood motion-picture production complex and its external spatial 
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Figure 4. Motion-picture production companies in Southern California. The inset shows 
locations of the majors and selected place-names. Sources of address data: Blu-Book, 2001 (Los 
Angeles: Hollywood Reporter), and Producers (Los Angeles: Ifilm).       49
   
 
Figure 5. Employment in the motion-picture industry, Los Angeles County and the USA. SIC 
7812 = Motion-Picture and Video Production; SIC 7819 = Services Allied to Motion Pictures. 
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Figure 6. Number of establishments in the motion-picture industry, Los Angeles County and the 
USA. SIC 7812 = Motion-Picture and Video Production; SIC 7819 = Services Allied to Motion 
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Figure 7. Analysis of runaway production; c1 is the average cost curve for a given package of 
production tasks in Hollywood; c2 is the average cost curve for the same tasks at a satellite 




Figure 8. Frequency distributions of domestic box-office returns for films released by majors 
and independents, 1999. Note that the x-axis is defined on a logarithmic scale. Source of data: 
National Association of Theatre Owners, Encyclopedia of Exhibition, 2000-2001.    53
Endnotes 
                                                  
1 This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under award number BCS-0091921, with 
supplementary funding from the Haynes Foundation. I am grateful to Kathleen Lee and Michael Storper for their 
comments on an early draft of this paper. 
2 Nowadays the industry spills over into other parts of the region lying well beyond its original confines in 
Hollywood proper; the term thus now has a synecdochic rather than literal meaning as a geographic designation.  
3 Paramount did not, however, sever the link between production and distribution (Robins, 1993). Had it done so, 
the entire subsequent history of Hollywood would almost certainly have turned out quite differently. Among other 
possible outcomes, the degree of concentration in the distribution segment of the industry might well have been 
reduced, thus opening up a wider market space for independent films of all kinds, and possibly inhibiting the 
majors’ shift into blockbuster productions. 
4 The term is taken from the jargon of the aerospace industry; see Scott (1993). 
5 Mezias and Mezias (2000) suggest that in 1929, vertically-integrated firms controlled about 80% of the market.  
6 MGM, by contrast, owns no studio facilities whatever, preferring to rent these as and when they may be needed. 
7 Some of the more important of these institutions being the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 
the Director’s Guild, the Producers’ Guild, the Screen Actors’ Guild, the Writers’ Guild, the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences (which organizes the annual Academy Awards), the Alliance of Motion Picture and 
Television Producers, the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, the American Film Marketing 
Association, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Entertainment Industry Development Corporation. 
8 “Runaways” re-surface in Canada as “export value.” 
9 These examples draw attention to the misnomer involved in the term “high concept” and clearly distinguish the 
type from the film d’auteur. 
10 Data from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Census, 1997.   
11 A strategy that has now more or less displaced earlier distribution methods based on exclusive booking of films 
in a few selected theaters, and reliance on word-of-mouth as a means of garnering audiences for subsequent rounds 
of release. 